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1. Introduction.
In this paper we provide a strategic approach to economies with diﬀerential information. Our
starting point is essentially the model of Radner (1968). Each agent has a private and incomplete
information structure about the future states of nature that describes the events she can observe.
It is supposed that a consumer can only carry out trades that are compatible with her private
information, that is, she cannot trade diﬀerently on states she is not able to distinguish. The
noncooperative solution, here called Walrasian Expectations Equilibrium, presumes that decisions
are made in an ex-ante stage, that information constraints are explicitly considered, and that agents
do not infer any additional information from the prevailing prices.
However, the formation of prices plays a central role in any discussion of the market process, and
this have given rise to a growing literature on market games. Several price-forming mechanisms
have been described in the literature - see, for instance, Shapley (1976), Shapley and Shubik (1977),
Dubey (1982), Dubey and Shapley (1994) and Dubey and Geanakoplos (2003).
In particular, in a seminal paper, Schmeidler (1980) presented a market game in which the
exchange mechanism that characterizes the economic institutions of trade is given by strategic
outcome functions, with players proposing consumption bundles and prices. In this way, he explained
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the price formation mechanism and proved that Nash equilibria of this market game are strong and
coincide with the Walrasian equilibria of the underlying Arrow-Debreu pure exchange economy.
As long as in a diﬀerential information context diﬀerent agents can diﬀer in their degrees of
knowledge about uncertainty, it is not surprising that a trade mechanism only based on a Schmeidler-
type outcome functions is not enough o characterize the equilibrium solutions. In fact, in a strategic
approach to Walrasian Expectations Equilibria, the main diﬃculty to overcome is that the outcomes
that an agent receives have to be compatible with her own private information.
For this reason, we propose a market game mechanism that links Schmeidler-type outcome func-
tions and a delegation rule, as well as allows agents to inform anonymous players about their
objective functions (who, by themselves, incorporate the information constraints). These players,
who are perfectly informed, propose proﬁles involving both prices and net trades. As in Schmeidler
(1980), the outcome function maps players’ simultaneous selections of strategies into allocations.
Our main result guarantees that every Walrasian Expectations Equilibrium allocation can be
obtained as a strong Nash equilibrium of the market game described above, and sheds light on the
fact that prices do not reveal any additional information about the states of nature to partially
informed agents. We state an example which shows that, without the delegation rule, it is no longer
possible to obtain the result. In addition, we provide an axiomatic characterization of the outcome
functions introduced by Schmeidler (1980) and used here.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we set the basic formal model of a
diﬀerential information economy and discuss both the non-free disposal condition and the relation-
ship between the concepts of Walrasian Expectation Equilibria and Arrow-Debreu Equilibria. In
Section 3 we recast the economy as a market game and present our main result. Section 4 provides
some examples that justify both our market game structure and our assumptions. Finally, the last
section lays the axiomatic characterization of the natural outcome function.
2. Model.
Consider a diﬀerential information economy E in which there is a ﬁnite set of states of nature,
Ω, and a ﬁnite set of agents, N, that trade ` commodities at each ω ∈ Ω. Given a partition P of Ω,
a commodity bundle x = (x(w))w∈Ω ∈ (R`
+)k, where k denotes the number of elements of Ω, is said
to be P-measurable when it is constant on the elements of the partition P.1
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Each agent i ∈ N is partially and privately informed about the states of nature in the economy:
he only knows a partition Pi of Ω, in the sense that he does not distinguish those states of nature
that are in the same element of Pi. Utility functions are given by Ui : (R`
+)k → R+ and are deﬁned
over the consumption set (R`
+)k. Moreover, by denoting IPi =

x ∈ (R`
+)k | x is Pi-measurable
	
as the set of consumption bundles that are compatible with information structure of agent i, we
suppose that initial endowments ei ∈ (R`
++)k belongs to IPi. We assume that
(A1) Utilities are strictly monotone in (R`
++)k, strictly quasi-concave, and diﬀerentiable. Moreover,
agents prefer an interior commodity bundle to any consumption bundle in the frontier of (R`
+)k.
We refer to an allocation x = (xi)i∈N as physically feasible if
n X
i=1
(xi − ei) ≤ 0, and as informa-
tionally feasible if xi ∈ IPi, for every i. A feasible allocation is both physically and informationally
feasible.








, that speciﬁes a commodity
price p(ω) ∈ R`
+ at each state ω ∈ Ω. Each agent i is a price taker individual who maximizes her
utility functions restricted to the allocations in her budget set
Bi(p) = {xi ∈ IPi |
X
ω∈Ω
p(ω) · (xi(ω) − ei(ω)) ≤ 0}.
We stress that though commodity prices, that agents take as given, can be diﬀerent across the
states of nature that are indistinguishable for them, the market cannot communicate any information
through the price system .2
Definition. A Walrasian expectations equilibrium for the economy E is a pair (x,p), where x =
(xi)i∈N is a feasible allocation and p is a price system, such that xi maximizes Ui on Bi(p) for all
i ∈ N.
Typically, a diﬀerential information economy is recast as an Arrow-Debreu economy in which the
information constraint is built into the consumption set of each agent. However, in this paper, we
will set up our Walrasian expectations economy as an Arrow-Debreu economy in which agents have
2Following Maus (2004), agents do not infer any new information from prices. They observe prices according to
their action possibilities, which are determined by their private information. Agent i perceives the price system p
under her information Pi as (p(Si))Si∈Pi, with p(Si) representing the same observed price in each state of Si, given





p(ω), where #Si denotes the cardinality of Si.4 A Market Game Approach to Differential Information Economies
the same consumption sets, but information structures are incorporated directly into the utility
functions.
More formally, given the economy E we can construct a complete information economy in which
the consumption set of agent i is (R`





Ui(x) if x ∈ IPi,
0 otherwise.
It is easy to check that both economies are equivalent with regard to the equilibria solutions.
In fact, Walrasian expectations equilibria of the diﬀerential information economy E are precisely
competitive equilibria in the Arrow-Debreu economy above described. Therefore, even without con-
tinuous preferences, there exist equilibria for this Arrow-Debreu economy, because Assumption (A1)
guarantees the existence of Walrasian expectations equilibria.
We remark that equilibria of this economy can present free disposal. Despite this, it is not diﬃ-
cult to prove that, if each state of nature is distinguished by at least one agent then any Walrasian
expectations equilibrium is a non-free disposal equilibrium and prices are strictly positive. To for-
malize this idea, we suppose that
(A2) Given any state ω ∈ Ω, there exists an agent i ∈ N such that, {w} ∈ Pi.
Note that, whenever there exists an agent who is completely informed about Ω, the assumption
above holds. Moreover, if the number of agents is much bigger than the set of states of nature, the
hypothesis seems to be not very restrictive.
Proposition. Let E be an information economy satisfying hypothesis (A2). If preferences are
strongly monotone then any Walrasian expectations equilibrium is a non-free disposal equilibrium.








i (ω) for a state of nature ω and for a physical commodity m. Then, strictly
monotonicity of preferences implies pm(ω) = 0.
By assumption (A2), there exists an agent j who distinguishes ω. Consider the consumption













. Observe that y is Pj-measurable and since pm(ω) = 0, we have
p·y = p·xj. Therefore, y belongs to Bj(p) and by strong monotonicity of preferences, Uj(y) > Uj(xj),
which is a contradiction.

3. A market game approach to differential information economies.
The aim of this section is to recover Walrasian expectations equilibria as Nash equilibria of a
game. For it, given the economy E described in Section 2, we construct a game where each consumer
is represented by a player with no informational restrictions.
Actually, in our game we suppose that agent i delegates to another individual, identiﬁed as player
i, the duty to ﬁnd an informationally compatible outcome that is optimal given the behavior of the
other market participants. In fact, agent i realizes that a fully informed representant will not have
problems in understanding strategy proﬁles, which may involve bundles and prices that are not
measurable regarding her private information. With this mechanism, agents know that they can
obtain the best response to the allocations chosen by the others.
Of course, we also suppose that (i) there is none economical incentive which allows agent i to
obtain more information directly from player i, and (ii) even in the case that this player is altruistic,
he only knows the objective function of the agent, ˜ Ui, that internalizes the information restriction
and, therefore, he does not know whether a null utility level is a consequence of either preferences
or the impossibility of agent i to understand the consumption bundle.
Therefore, players, although fully informed, are only interested in ﬁnding an optimal response
that is compatible with the information of the agents.
As in our economy agents have incomplete information, it is not very surprising that we need
a more sophisticated type of market game than the one in Schmeidler (1980). In fact, avoiding
fully informed players, it is not possible to neutralize the diversity of agents’ information structures
because, if (partially informed) consumers are by themselves the players, Nash equilibria of the
corresponding market game may not lead to Walrasian expectations equilibria (see Example 1, in
the next section).
Now, let Γ = {Θi,πi}i∈N be a game where Θi is the strategy set and πi the payoﬀ function
of player i. A strategy θi for player i is a vector zi ∈ (R`)k and a price system pi ∈ ∆ such
that pi · zi = 0. Hence, Θi =

(zi,pi) ∈ (R`)k × ∆ | pi · zi = 0
	
. We stress that the amount vector
zi ∈ (R`)k that player i proposes is not required to be measurable with respect to her private




Θi be the set of strategy proﬁles. Given a strategy proﬁle θ, each player i will trade
only with those individuals that propose the same prices, Ai(θ) = {j ∈ N | pj = pi}.
As exchange of commodities takes place among members that choose the same prices, their
aggregated net outcome need to be zero. Therefore, as in Schmeidler (1980), each player receives
the original net demand proposed adjusted by the average excess of demand of individuals that
choose the same price as him. Formally, given a strategy proﬁle θ, the agent i receives






where #Ai(θ) denotes the cardinality of the set Ai(θ).
Hence, the ith player payoﬀ function πi : Θ → R is deﬁned by πi(θ) = ˜ Ui(fi(θ) + ei).
For a proﬁle θ, let θ−S denote a strategy selection for all players except those belonging to the
coalition S. We write θ = (θ−S,θS). A strategy proﬁle θ∗ = (θ∗
i )i∈N is a Nash equilibrium if, for
each player i ∈ N, πi(θ∗) ≥ πi(θ∗
−i,θi), for all θi ∈ Θi. In addition, a strategy proﬁle θ∗ is said to
be a strong Nash equilibrium if it is not upset by any coalition of players. That is, if does not
exist a coalition S and a strategy proﬁle θ such that, for every player i ∈ S, πi(θ∗
−S,θS) ≥ πi(θ∗),
with strict inequality holding for some player in the coalition S.
Theorem. Let E be an economy with private information satisfying assumptions (A1)-(A2), with
at least three agents. Let Γ be the associated game. Then,
I. If (x∗,p∗) is a Walrasian expectations equilibrium of E, then θ∗ = ((x∗
i − ei,p∗)i∈N) is a
strong Nash equilibrium of Γ.
II. Reciprocally, if θ∗ is a Nash equilibrium of the game Γ, then all the players propose the same
prices p∗ and ((fi(θ∗) + ei)i∈N,p∗) is a Walrasian expectations equilibrium of E.
Proof.
I. Let (x∗,p∗) be a Walrasian expectations equilibrium of E and deﬁne θ∗
i = (x∗
i − ei,p∗) for every
i. By deﬁnition, it follows that fi(θ∗) + ei = x∗
i = di(p∗).
Let θi = (zi,p). If p 6= p∗, then fi(θ∗
−i,θi) = 0 and πi(θ∗
−i,θi) = Ui(ei) ≤ πi(θ∗) = Ui(di(p∗)). If
p = p∗ then πi(θ∗
−i,θi) = Ui(zi + ei) ≤ πi(θ∗) = Ui(di(p∗)).
Therefore, given the strategy proﬁle θ∗, no agent i can get greater payoﬀs by choosing a strategy
diﬀerent from θ∗
i , while the other players choose θ∗
−i. Hence, θ∗ is a Nash equilibrium of Γ.G. Fugarolas, C. Herv´ es-Beloso, E. Moreno-Garc´ ıa, and J.P.Torres-Mart´ ınez 7
Moreover, suppose that θ∗ is not a strong Nash equilibrium. Then, there exists a coalition S and





≥ πi(θ∗) with strict inequality holding for at least one
j ∈ S. Then, pj 6= p∗ and #Aj(θ∗
−S,θS) > 1. Thus, the coalition Aj(θ∗
−S,θS) privately blocks the
allocation x∗, which is a contradiction with the fact that x∗ belongs to the private core of E.3
II. Let θ∗ be a Nash equilibrium of Γ. To see that (fi(θ∗) + ei,p∗) is a Walrasian expectations
equilibrium of E let us show that fi(θ∗) + ei ∈ IPi for all i ∈ N. Otherwise there exists an agent
i such that πi(θ∗) = ˜ Ui(fi(θ∗) + ei) = 0. Consider that player i chooses θi = (0,p) with p 6= p∗
j
for any j 6= i. Note that in this case Ai(θ∗
−i,θi) = {i} and fi(θ∗
−i,θi) = 0. Then, by monotonicity
of the preferences it follows that ˜ Ui(ei) = Ui(ei) > 0, that is, πi(θ∗
−i,θi) > πi(θ∗) = 0, which is a
contradiction. Therefore, if θ∗ is a Nash equilibrium of Γ, then fi(θ∗) + ei ∈ IPi for all i ∈ N and
πi(θ∗) = Ui(fi(θ∗) + ei).
In order to obtain the result, and following the proof stated in Schmeidler (1980, p. 1588-1589), it
is not diﬃcult to guarantee ﬁrstly, that for any diﬀerent agents i,j ∈ N, Ui(fi(θ∗)+ei) ≥ Ui(di(p∗
j)).
Secondly, that if θ∗ is a Nash equilibrium, then all players propose the same prices and if #Ai(θ∗) ≥ 2
then #Ai(θ∗) = N. Finally, we conﬁrm that there exists an agent i such that #Ai(θ∗) ≥ 2 and
conclude that under any Nash equilibrium all players propose the same prices.

4. Some Counterexamples.
In this section we ﬁrst present an example which enables us to show that if informational feasi-
bility is required for the quantities proposed, i.e., agents are those who play the game, then Nash
equilibria do not coincide with Walrasian expectations equilibria of the economy.
Example 1. Consider a diﬀerential information economy with three types of agents and two
consumers of each type. There are three states of nature {a,b,c} and one commodity in each state.
All agents have the same utility function U(x,y,z) = xyz, and the three types are characterized by
3The private core is the set of allocations that are not privately blocked. An allocation is privately blocked by a
coalition S if there exists another feasible allocation for S such that every member becomes better oﬀ (see Yannelis
(1991)).8 A Market Game Approach to Differential Information Economies
the following private information and initial endowments,
P1 = {{a,b},{c}}, e1 = (1,1,2),
P2 = {{a},{b,c}}, e2 = (2,1,1),
P3 = {{a,c},{b}}, e3 = (1,2,1).
The unique Walrasian expectations equilibrium is given by the price system p = (1,1,1) and the
equalitarian allocation xi = (4
3, 4
3, 4
3) which, for all agent i, is informationally feasible, independently
of the information structure.















































Note that in this case, the net bundles and price vectors that each player proposes in her strategy
set are measurable with respect to the type’s information that she represents.
It is not diﬃcult to see that, when players are restricted to choose prices and bundles in accor-
dance to the information of the agent that they are representing, θ is a Nash equilibrium in which
there is no trade, and therefore does not coincide with the Walrasian expectations equilibrium of
the underlying economy. 
In the following two examples, we remark two essential elements in the Schmeidler(1980) contri-
bution that remain valid in the diﬀerential information framework.
On the one hand, trade mechanism is carried out among players who choose the same prices for
all commodities. Thus, agents who announce diﬀerent price systems do not trade at all, even if
prices are equal for some goods. The next example shows that if we consider a mechanism in the
game that enables agents to trade the commodity h whenever they announce the same price for it,
Walrasian equilibria cannot be supported as Nash equilibria.
Example 2. Consider a pure exchange economy with three agents and two commodities. All the
consumers have the same utility function U(x,y) = xy and their initial endowments are ω1 = (1,2),
ω2 = (2,1), and ω3 = (1,1). Then, the unique Walrasian equilibrium is given by the price system
(px,py) = (1,1) as well as the allocation (x1,y1) = (3
2, 3
2), (x2,y2) = (3
2, 3
2), and (x3,y3) = (1,1).G. Fugarolas, C. Herv´ es-Beloso, E. Moreno-Garc´ ıa, and J.P.Torres-Mart´ ınez 9





2),(1,1)), and θ3 = ((0,0),(1,1)), is a Nash equilibrium of our market game.
Now, consider that it is enough for the trade mechanism to run that players propose the same
price for only one commodity, and not the whole price vector.4 Then θ = (θ1,θ2,θ3) is no longer
a Nash equilibrium. For instance, player 1 has incentives to deviate and announce the strategy
¯ θ1 = ((1
2,−1),(1, 1
2)). 
Finally, we give an example which shows that in our main result it is necessary to have more
than two agents,
Example 3. Consider a pure exchange economy with two agents and two commodities. Both agents
have the same utility function, U(x,y) = xy, and endowments given by ω1 = (2,2) and ω2 = (2,1).
The unique equilibrium for this economy is given by the prices (px,py) = (1, 4
3) and the allocations
(x1,y1) = (7
3, 7
4) and (x2,y2) = (5
3, 5
4).
If we consider the proﬁle θ1 = ((0,0),(1,2)) and θ2 = ((0,0),(1,1)) then πh(θ1,θ2) = wh, for
each player h. It is not diﬃcult to see that (θ1,θ2) is a Nash equilibrium which does not result in a
Walrasian equilibrium. 
5. An axiomatic approach to the outcome functions.
The outcome function used to frame a diﬀerential information economy as a strategic market
game is the same as that in Schmeidler’s (1980) seminal paper. In this section, in spite of the
intuition of this outcome function, we provide an axiomatic approach that exhibits this function as
the unique solution.
Firstly, note that it is natural to suppose that an arbitrary outcome function Hi for a player i is
anonymous in the sense that, on the one hand, gives the same treatment to player i as the outcome
function Hj gives to j; and, on the other hand, only takes into account the proﬁles chosen by
the players, and not their identity. Moreover, given a proﬁle, the outcome that i receives depends
only on the strategies chosen by those players that propose an identical price, because in any
4Formally, outcome functions are given by gi(θ) = (gi,h(θ))h∈{1,2,...,`}, where









i (θ) = {j ∈ N |pj,h = pi,h} denotes the set of players proposing the same price for commodity h ∈ {1,2,...,`}.10 A Market Game Approach to Differential Information Economies




h | h ∈ Ai(θ1)} = {θ2
h | h ∈ Aj(θ2)}, we suppose that Hi(θ1) = Hj(θ2).
Indeed, we assume that not only function Hi is linear in the net demand chosen by the players,
but also that both (a) the outcome of a commodity h that the ith player receives only depends on
net demand proﬁles (zj,h)j∈N, and (b) the ﬁnal commodity h outcome that player i obtains only
changes with the amounts of (zj,h)j∈N. So, we have that




for some real functions (α(·),β(·)) and for each proﬁle θ = (zj,pj)j∈N.
Thus, requiring that (i) outcomes will be feasible across the families of players that choose the
same prices,
P
j∈Ai(θ) Hj(θ) = 0; and (ii) strategies that are originally physically feasible will not
be aﬀected by the outcome function (i.e. if
P
j∈Ai(θ) zj = 0 then Hi(θ) = zi(θ)), it follows that, for
each proﬁle θ, α(θ) − β(θ) = 1 and α(θ) + β(θ)(#Ai(θ) − 1) = 0.
Therefore, if #Ai(θ) > 1, α(θ) = 1 − 1
#Ai(θ) and β(θ) = − 1
#Ai(θ). When #Ai(θ) = 1, equations
above imply α(θ) = 0 and β(θ) = −1. In any case, we have Hi(θ) = fi(θ), for all proﬁle θ. This
shows that the unique outcome function satisfying the conditions above is the one we are using in
our market game.
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